Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International
Journal
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 7

July 2006

A New Chapter of Irony: The Legal Implications of the Darfur
Genocide Determination
Jerry Fowler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp

Recommended Citation
Fowler, Jerry (2006) "A New Chapter of Irony: The Legal Implications of the Darfur Genocide
Determination," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 1: Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol1/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of
Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

A New Chapter of Irony: The Legal
Implications of the Darfur Genocide
Determination
Jerry Fowler
Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum1
US Secretary of State Colin Powell determined that genocide as defined in the UN
Genocide Convention had occurred in Darfur, but he disclaimed any new
obligations as a result of that determination. Under the permissive provisions of
Article 8 of the convention, he called upon the UN Security Council to investigate
whether genocide or other crimes were being committed, with a view to
accountability. The subsequent investigation by a UN Commission of Inquiry
concluded, on rather dubious grounds, that the Sudanese government was not
responsible for genocide but recommended referral of the situation to the
International Criminal Court for purposes of accountability; ironically, the
opposite conclusions of Powell and the UN Commission produced the same
result: a call for steps toward accountability. A further irony is that the UN
Convention, although articulating an international condemnation of the crime of
genocide, compels nothing more. The attempts at the September 2005 World
Summit to obtain recognition of an international responsibility to protect underscored the fundamental reality that nations will not act decisively to confront
genocide and other massive human rights abuses out of a sense of legal obligation,
but only as a matter of political and practical necessity.

Legal scholar Diane Orentlicher once observed that the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) ‘‘has come to
embody the conscience of humanity.’’2 She then acidly remarked that the convention’s
‘‘moral force is surely ironic,’’ in light of the persistent failure of governments to enforce
its terms.3 Darfur adds another sad chapter of irony in the convention’s history, given
the dramatic incongruity between the sense of urgency that one might expect a
plausible case of ongoing genocide to engender and the relatively lackadaisical
international political response that has in fact unfolded. As it turns out, this irony is
embedded in the provisions of the UNCG itself. After calling for international
cooperation ‘‘to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge,’’ the convention
proceeds to define the crime of genocide in terms that, from the perspective of
‘‘preventing’’ or ‘‘suppressing’’ genocide, are problematic. It then offers only the vaguest
sense of what should be done when genocide is imminent or actually under way.

‘‘To Liberate Mankind from Such an Odious Scourge’’
Though there are examples of mass violence directed against identifiable groups
dating back to antiquity, ‘‘genocide’’ as a term and a concept has a quite recent origin.
Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish lawyer who fled Poland after the German invasion in 1939,
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coined the word and introduced it in 1944.4 He derived it from the Greek for tribe
or nation (geno-) and the Latin for killing (-cide). By ‘‘genocide,’’ Lemkin meant
‘‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves.’’5
In no small part due to the efforts of Lemkin himself, his new word soon gained
currency.6 It was mentioned in the 1945 Nuremberg indictment as a description of war
crimes committed by the defendants being tried before the International Military
Tribunal.7 In December 1946, the General Assembly of the newly created United
Nations adopted a resolution that described genocide as ‘‘a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups’’ that ‘‘shocks the conscience of mankind’’ and
‘‘affirm[ed]’’ that genocide is ‘‘crime under international law.’’8
That resolution also set in motion the process that resulted in the adoption of
the UNCG on 9 December 1948.9 The convention itself is rather a spare document—
nineteen articles, of which the last nine are more technical than substantive, dealing
with matters such as where states that become parties to the convention shall deposit
their instruments of ratification or accession (with the secretary-general of the United
Nations); how many states must become parties before the convention comes into force
(twenty, a number reached in late 1950); and where the original copy of the convention
would be held (in the UN archives).
The convention’s preamble invokes ‘‘international law’’ and ‘‘the spirit and aims of
the United Nations,’’ as well as the condemnation of genocide ‘‘by the civilized world.’’
It echoes the General Assembly’s view that international cooperation is necessary
to free humanity from the ‘‘odious scourge’’ of genocide. To that end, Article I specifies
that ‘‘genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and to
punish.’’
The heart of the substantive portion of the convention is Article II, which defines
genocide as a matter of international law. The definition has two essential components:
a specified physical act (what lawyers would call the actus reus) and a particular state
of mind (technically, a mens rea). The specified acts cannot constitute genocide unless
they are committed with the requisite state of mind.
The specified acts are the following:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The required state of mind—which distinguishes genocide from any other crime—
is the ‘‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.’’ Thus, merely intending to commit the specified acts is not enough. The
perpetrators must also have a ‘‘specific’’ or ‘‘special’’ intent to destroy a protected group
in whole or in part.10 Establishing the subjective intent harbored in the minds of
perpetrators can present vexing issues of proof, especially when events are unfolding
in some inaccessible location. As discussed more fully below, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of specific acts can provide evidence of the intent with
which those acts are committed.
30
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Several articles flesh out the central idea that genocide is an international crime,
and therefore punishable. Article III explains that not only genocide itself but also
‘‘conspiracy to commit genocide,’’ ‘‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide,’’
‘‘attempt to commit genocide,’’ and ‘‘complicity in genocide’’ can be punished. According
to Article IV, perpetrators are subject to punishment without regard to their status as
‘‘constitutionally responsible rulers’’ or holders of some other public office. In Article V,
the parties ‘‘undertake’’ to pass whatever domestic legislation might be necessary to
give effect to the terms of the convention, specifically emphasizing punishment for
genocide and the other crimes listed in Article III. For good measure, Article VI adds
an unspecified ‘‘international penal tribunal’’11 as a possible venue for trying those
accused of genocide, in addition to courts in the territory where the criminal acts were
committed.12 Article VII addresses the extradition of accused perpetrators from one
country in order to stand trial in another.
As terse as are the provisions related to punishment of genocide, the convention’s
other avowed goal—that of genocide prevention—gets even shorter shrift. Article VIII
merely states that a party to the convention ‘‘may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide’’
(emphasis added). Tossing the ball into the UN’s court, in other words, is permitted but
not required.
No other article refers to prevention, except for Article I’s rather ambiguous
statement that parties to the convention ‘‘undertake to prevent’’ genocide. Exactly
what obligation this language imposes is not clear. Particularly opaque is whether the
undertaking to prevent genocide is directed at a state’s own territory or territory under
its control or whether it imposes some duty on parties to act wherever in the world
genocide might be threatened or occur. Some scholars have asserted the latter.13 Yet
the language of the convention does not give any indication that such an extensive
obligation was contemplated. Indeed, it would be quite bizarre to think that the
drafters intended in 1948 to make intervention in the internal affairs of other states
obligatory for individual states or groups of states (through the broad interpretation of
Article I), while recourse to the United Nations is merely optional (under the plain
terms of Article VIII). Such a scheme diverges wildly from the structure for
maintaining international peace and security established just three years earlier
with the adoption of the UN Charter and the creation of the United Nations itself.
And in the almost six decades since the adoption of the UNCG, there is scant evidence
of state practice evincing a sense of obligation to prevent or suppress genocide in other
countries pursuant to Article I. When Bosnia argued before the International Court of
Justice that all parties to the UNCG had a duty under Article I to prevent genocide
against it and its citizens, the ad hoc judge appointed by Bosnia itself could only
observe, rather morosely, that ‘‘the limited reaction of the parties to the Genocide
Convention in relation [to past episodes of apparent genocide] may represent a practice
suggesting the permissibility of inactivity.’’14 Likewise, the May 1994 internal State
Department memorandum to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher recommending that the United States begin to use the word ‘‘genocide’’ in relation to Rwanda
noted that such a move ‘‘would not have any particular legal consequences.’’15

Is, Is Not
The UNCG provided the framework within which US Secretary of State Colin Powell
and the United States government considered, in mid-2004, the question of whether
31
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genocide was occurring in Darfur. Applying Article II’s legal definition to the facts
gathered by the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT) and from other sources, they
concluded that genocide had been committed and that the government of Sudan and its
militia allies—the so-called Janjaweed—were responsible.16
In announcing his determination, Secretary Powell pointed to murder, rape, and
other physical violence committed against members of non-Arab ethnic groups. This
violence corresponded with the acts specified in Article II (a) and (b) of the UNCG—
killing members of a group and causing serious bodily or mental harm to them. He also
pointed to the destruction of foodstuffs and other means of survival of the targeted
groups, coupled with obstruction by the Sudanese government of the humanitarian
assistance that the victims needed in order to survive. This conduct, which itself
inflicted a large number of deaths on the targeted population in addition to those
caused by direct violence, corresponded with article II(c)—deliberately inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction, in whole
or in part.
As for the ‘‘intent to destroy’’ required by Article II, Powell concluded that intent
could be inferred from the Sudanese government’s deliberate conduct. Inferring intent
from conduct in the absence of direct evidence is widely accepted. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), for example, has listed a number of
circumstances that are relevant to determining ‘‘intent to destroy,’’ many of which
are present in the case of Darfur: ‘‘the general context of the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group’’; ‘‘the scale of atrocities
committed’’; the ‘‘general nature’’ of the atrocities; deliberately and systematically
targeting members of some groups but not others; attacks on (or perceived by the
perpetrators to be attacks on) ‘‘the foundation of the group’’; ‘‘the use of derogatory
language toward members of the targeted group’’; ‘‘the systematic manner of killing’’;
and ‘‘the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of
a group.’’17
In this regard, Powell’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
emphasized the scale and scope of the murder and rape of civilians as well as the fact
that the actions of the Sudanese military and its militia allies were ‘‘a coordinated
effort, not just random violence.’’18 Additionally, in the report released along with the
testimony, the ADT’s investigation documented substantial use of racial epithets and
derogatory language directed against members of non-Arab ethnic groups in
conjunction with violence.19 Powell also noted Khartoum’s failure to cease and desist
from the attacks on non-Arab groups and its continued obstruction of humanitarian
aid even after having been repeatedly put on notice by other governments and by the
United Nations.
Invoking Article VIII of the UNCG, Powell called upon the United Nations to
undertake its own investigation. Thus, the only specific outcome of the genocide
determination was the September 18 passage by the UN Security Council of Resolution
1564, which requested that the UN secretary-general appoint an International
Commission of Inquiry to look into whether acts of genocide had in fact occurred and to
identify perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. While awaiting the commission’s report, the Security Council decided ‘‘to remain
seized of the matter.’’
At the end of January 2005, the commission issued its report, which documented
the Sudanese government’s role in organizing, arming, and training the Janjaweed
militia. Page after page of the voluminous report laid responsibility for serious
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violations of international humanitarian and human rights law at the government’s
doorstep. The commission concluded that the government and its allies bore primary
responsibility for massive violence against civilians that had a pronounced ethnic
dimension. Addressing the particular terms of the UNCG, the commission noted that
its investigation
collected substantial and reliable material which tends to show the occurrence of
systematic killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes, of large-scale causing of
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the population belonging to certain tribes,
and of massive and deliberate infliction on those tribes of conditions of life bringing
about their physical destruction in whole or in part (for example by systematically
destroying their villages and crops, by expelling them from their homes, and by looting
their cattle).20

The commission believed that this evidence could establish the physical acts
enumerated in Article II(a)–(c).21
But then the Commission explicitly ‘‘conclude[d] that the Government of Sudan
has not pursued a policy of genocide’’ based on the absence of the required ‘‘intent to
destroy.’’22 Although the commission’s report acknowledges that the scale of the
atrocities, the systematic nature of the atrocities, and racially motivated statements by
perpetrators indicated genocidal intent, it asserts that ‘‘other more indicative
elements’’ pointed to a lack of intent. The commission identifies three elements
supposed to be ‘‘more indicative.’’23
First, in some unspecified number of villages, the attackers ‘‘refrained from
exterminating the whole population.’’24 As evidence, the commission refers to one
group of villages in which the government commissioner and the leader of the Arab
militias executed about 227 of some 1,200 people who were captured after the attack.
Apparently, fifteen of the executed were on a written list brought by the perpetrators,
seven were village leaders (omdas), and 205 were accused of being rebels. The
commission’s reference to the fact that the perpetrators did not ‘‘exterminat[e] the
whole population’’ is puzzling. The plain language of the convention includes an intent
to destroy a group ‘‘in part.’’ The commission itself explains in a previous paragraph
that international case law establishes that ‘‘the intent to destroy a group ‘in part’
requires the intention to destroy a ‘considerable number of individuals’ or
‘a substantial part,’ but not necessarily a ‘very important part of the group.’’’25 The
commission fails to offer any reason why 227 out of 1,200 is neither a ‘‘considerable
number of individuals’’ (in relation to that sample) nor ‘‘a substantial part’’ of that
sample, especially when the community leadership was particularly targeted.
Moreover, it seems to take at face value the perpetrators’ reported assertion that
the 205 murdered villagers were rebels, leading the comission to distinguish between
‘‘the intent . . . to destroy an ethnic group as such’’ and ‘‘the intention to murder all
those men they considered to be rebels.’’ Yet, on just the previous page, the commission
quotes a number of utterances in which the perpetrators used ethnic identity, racial
epithets, and terms such as Torabora (slang for ‘‘rebels’’) interchangeably.26 The whole
point of the government’s campaign against the civilian population of non-Arab ethnic
groups was equating ethnicity with rebellion, rendering it nonsensical to distinguish
an intent to destroy those ethnic groups from an intent to murder rebels. The targets
were, by the Sudanese government’s apparent definition, one and the same.27
The second element cited by the commission as indicating a lack of genocidal intent
is that the Sudanese government collects survivors of destroyed villages in camps for
internally displaced persons (IDPs), where it ‘‘generally allows humanitarian
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organizations to help the population . . . by providing food, clean water, medicines and
logistical assistance.’’28 This element begs the question of whether the direct violence
(i.e., murdering and raping) was of sufficient scale to evince the intent to destroy the
targeted groups ‘‘in part,’’ even though there are survivors who were not murdered
outright. And the commission offers no rationale explaining why this element should
be more indicative of intent than the scale and systematic nature of direct violence. It
also skirts the issues of government obstacles to humanitarian aid, which were
reduced but not eliminated by concerted international pressure in mid-2004;
continuing elevated mortality rates in these camps; and continuing attacks (meaning
murder and rape) against those who venture out of the camps in search of essentials of
life such as firewood, water, or food.
The third element identified by the commission is that some unspecified number of
villages with a mixed ethnic composition had not been attacked at the time the
commission was undertaking its investigation. It is difficult to know what to make of
this assertion as the commission makes no effort to contextualize it. For example,
it does not quantify the number of untouched villages in relation to the number of
villages destroyed, or by relating the number of inhabitants of such villages to the
number of civilians who were subject to murder, rape, or displacement. Just as
importantly, previously unharmed villages were being attacked and destroyed during
the time that the commission was researching and writing its report.29
The commission’s final paragraph of analysis regarding intent is perhaps the most
difficult to fathom. It recounts a single anecdote from ‘‘a reliable source’’ in which one
man was not killed when ‘‘attackers’’—there is no identification of these attackers—
took 200 camels from him. By contrast, the man’s younger brother resisted the theft
of his one camel and was shot dead. ‘‘Clearly,’’ the commission concludes, ‘‘in this
instance the special intent to kill a member of a group to destroy the group as such was
lacking, the murder being only motivated by the desire to appropriate cattle belonging
to the inhabitants of the village.’’30 Perhaps the requisite intent was indeed missing in
that one instance. But the relationship of that one instance to the overall situation—in
which ‘‘pillaging and destruction . . . appears to have been directed to bring about the
destruction of the livelihoods and means of survival of’’ the targeted populations31—is
a mystery.

Weighing the Evidence
Although Powell and the UN’s Commission of Inquiry operated from a largely similar
factual base, they reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the question of
genocide. One explanation for this may be an issue that neither addressed explicitly:
the weight of evidence necessary to reach a conclusion. In these circumstances, how
much evidence of genocidal intent—in terms of quality and credibility—is necessary
relative to evidence of a lack of intent?
The commission hints that it applied an extremely high standard in assessing the
evidence. ‘‘Courts and other bodies charged with establishing whether genocide has
occurred,’’ the report notes, ‘‘must however be very careful in the determination of
subjective intent.’’32 It then approvingly quotes the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia for the proposition that ‘‘[c]onvictions for genocide can be
entered only where intent has been unequivocally established.’’33 In essence, the
commission adopted for itself the standard that intent must be shown ‘‘beyond
reasonable doubt’’—the weight of evidence necessary to convict an individual in a
criminal trial.34 This is the most exacting burden imaginable—an understandable
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burden for a prosecutor to bear when a court is deciding the life or liberty of
an individual.
Viewed in the context of this burden, the commission’s analysis on the issue of
genocidal intent is less mysterious. The three ‘‘elements’’ it cites, though not
particularly compelling, do cast some doubt on the existence of a genocidal intent on
the part of the Sudanese government. One might well conclude that the evidence of
genocidal intent that is adduced in the commission’s report, though quite strong, does
not establish such intent ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt.’’
But this standard is clearly wrong under these circumstances. The commission
was not a court of law, nor was it adjudicating the fate of individual defendants. The
liberty of an accused defendant did not turn on its decision. Quite to the contrary,
the commission was called upon only to make a threshold finding on the basis of which
the UN Security Council would decide whether to take additional action, including
referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a full-fledged
criminal investigation.
A review of the ICC Statute makes clear the commission’s error in applying the
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard. The statute contemplates several stages through
which a case proceeds, each requiring that a separate weight of evidence be met. When
a situation is referred to the ICC, the prosecutor is required to initiate an investigation
unless ‘‘there is no reasonable basis to proceed.’’35 Having conducted an investigation,
the prosecutor may seek an arrest warrant if he or she can establish ‘‘reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.’’36 The court is next called upon to confirm the charges, which it will do if the
prosecutor offers ‘‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that
the person committed the crime charged.’’37 Finally, at trial, an individual can only be
convicted if the court is ‘‘convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.’’38
Between ‘‘no reasonable basis to proceed’’ and ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ lies a
continuum along which the required weight of evidence steadily, and appropriately,
mounts as the process moves forward. To eliminate that continuum and require a
prosecutor to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a condition of launching an
investigation would be nonsensical. Yet that is the standard of proof apparently
applied by the commission, in spite of the fact that its investigation was prefatory to
any judicial action. The commission’s application of this standard is all the more
erroneous in light of the constraints placed upon it by the amount of time available,39
as well as the continued perpetration of the very crimes it was supposed to investigate.
It was not in any conceivable position to reach a conclusion ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’
on an issue as complex and problematic as genocidal intent.
As previously mentioned, Powell did not articulate what weight of evidence he
looked for in making his determination. But the tenor of his analysis, which
emphasized the necessarily limited nature of the ADT investigation and other
information available, suggests that he was, in essence, asserting a reasonable basis
for concluding that the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed allies had committed
genocide. The additional facts established by the commission confirm the existence of
that reasonable basis.

Politics, Not Law
If a determination of genocide is to be a predicate for further action—whether the
launching of a judicial investigation or the launching of humanitarian intervention or
35
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anything else—the weight of evidence necessary to support that finding cannot be
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt.’’ That level of evidence will simply not be available until
those in danger are long dead. Commissions or diplomats or politicians can take
endless refuge behind every fig leaf of doubt. Outside of a formal judicial process,
it only makes sense to speak of a reasonable basis to believe that genocide is occurring
or threatened.
But the ultimate irony of the UNCG is that, when it comes to ‘‘preventing’’ or
‘‘suppressing’’ genocide, a determination of genocide does not trigger any form of action
whatsoever. If this was not already clear from the convention’s plain language, it was
made starkly so by Secretary Powell’s assertion on 9 September 2004, that ‘‘no new
action is dictated by this determination.’’40 Powell’s affirmative determination and the
commission’s negative one had the same effect. The UNCG, for all its supposed moral
force, in actuality contributes little to prevention or suppression.
Powell’s request to the United Nations, pursuant to the permissive provisions
of Article VIII, to launch an investigation was made ‘‘with a view to ensuring
accountability’’—that is, punishment. Yet punishment is not the same as prevention or
suppression. It inevitably occurs, if at all, after the time for preventing or suppressing
has passed. One may argue that a sufficiently real threat of punishment may have a
deterrent effect powerful enough to stop ongoing acts of genocide or to prevent
imminent acts. But that argument is purely theoretical. And the continued
deterioration of the situation in Darfur months after the Security Council referred
the situation to the ICC suggests that the theory may be faulty.
Powell’s request under Article VIII of the UNCG, Security Council Resolution
1564, the UN Commission of Inquiry’s investigation, the commission’s analysis of
genocidal intent—all were couched in the language of law drawn from the UNCG and
other legal instruments. But in a very real sense, the whole process was a burlesque of
law. Essentially, everything documented by the commission was not only knowable but
actually known months and months before the commission was even formed. Even as
the commission was conducting its investigation, the government of Sudan was
continuing to perpetrate the very crimes that the commission was analyzing. During
the whole time that the basic facts have been known, and even since the commission
released its report, no effective action has been taken by the so-called international
community actually to stop the killing and the rapes. It is as though one man is
clubbing another on a street corner while bystanders respond with a prolonged
reflection on whether the incident is premeditated murder or simple assault or even
self-defense. Meanwhile, the crime continues.
Powell, near the end of his testimony in September 2004, told the Senate
committee that ‘‘[w]e have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese
government to act responsibly.’’ He certainly deserves credit for going out of his way
to identify himself with a difficult issue, and there are many officials in the State
Department and elsewhere in the US government who have been working diligently on
Darfur. But the definition of ‘‘everything we can’’ is ultimately a political question, not
a legal one. And effective prevention and suppression of ‘‘genocide’’—or other forms of
mass atrocities against civilian populations—will not occur through a sense of
obligation under international law but as the result of political pressure on
governments by their citizens. As Samantha Power has argued, politicians will act
to stop mass killing when the political cost of inaction outweighs the risk of acting.41
In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, held to mark the sixtieth anniversary
of the United Nations, a draft General Assembly resolution was circulated that would
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have recognized an ‘‘obligation’’ of UN members to use various peaceful means ‘‘to help
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.’’ The draft would also have recognized a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ to take
collective coercive action under the UN Charter if peaceful means fail and national
authorities are ‘‘unwilling or unable to protect their populations.’’ In the end, the first
passage was watered down to acknowledge a ‘‘responsibility’’ to use ‘‘appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means.’’ The second passage jettisoned
the notion of a responsibility to act and replaced it with the statement that
we are prepared to take collective action . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.42

Being ‘‘prepared’’ to do something case-by-case is in fact consistent with actually not
doing anything from case to case.
It may well be that the final language approved by the UN General Assembly
represents a normative advance. It is certainly more explicit than anything in the
UNCG. It also broadens the circumstances in which action may be taken beyond the
narrow category of genocide by adding war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity, which may forestall endless arguments about the complex and
problematic notion of genocidal intent. But the final language underscores the fact that
the prevention and suppression of genocide and other mass atrocities will never be
accomplished by the international community, or by members of that community,
through a sense of legal obligation. It will happen, if at all, as a result of political or
practical necessity. Only by recognizing and acting on this reality can we hope to end
the heartbreaking irony of a universally condemned crime that is allowed to occur in
broad daylight.
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